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This is the second comprehensive treatise on labor relations law in the
United States, devoting major attention to the Taft-Hartley Act, written by
an economist for students of industrial relations. In 1950 appeared From
the Wagner Act to Taft-Hartley by Harry A. Millis and Emily C. Brown,
which was not quite finished at the time of the death of its senior author,
the former chairman of the National Labor Relations Board and for many
years the dean of all labor economists. Now Government and Collective
Bargaininghas made its appearance, written by a much younger economist,
a professor at Indiana University.
This treatise covers a broader scope than its predecessor. It presents
the story of the development of labor relations law in this country from
the earliest days down to 1950. About a third of the book is devoted to the
period before the Wagner Act, which is scarcely touched upon in From
the Wagner Act to Taft-Hartley. It deals only briefly with the Wagner Act,
its interpretation and operation, to which most of the earlier book is devoted. More than half of the entire treatise considers the several provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act and their interpretation. Throughout
the author is concerned with the effects of statutes and court decisions
upon unionism and collective bargaining, rather than with their logic or
the legal reasoning behind them.
The author regards labor unions as an essential of a democratic way
of life. "Collective bargaining offers the American worker the only effective means whereby he can realize social and industrial justice." He sees
little need for government regulation of unions and collective bargaining,
but deems it sound public policy that the government should protect and
encourage collective bargaining. He concedes the necessity for more
active government intervention in wartime and when strikes occur which
produce national emergencies, but would have the government pursue
a "hands off" policy in normal times, except to encourage the determination
of conditions of employment through collective bargaining and to attempt
to prevent and settle labor disputes through mediation.
Along with faith in unionism and collective bargaining, the author
has a deep-seated distrust of anti-union employers and of government
officials unsympathetic to labor. He finds that the courts, generally, have
been unfriendly to labor, although in the nineteen-thirties they were respon(147)
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sive to a more favorable public opinion. He ascribes the enactment of the
Taft-Hartley Act and restrictive state legislation to anti-union sentiment
among employers and to their propaganda campaigns.
While Professor Witney has not done much original research in this
field, he has read widely on all aspects of labor relations law. He discusses
statutes, court decisions, and legal theories competently, but contributes
little toward a better understanding of what is generally discussed as the
law of labor relations. It is with the law in action, rather than the law
per se that this book is principally concerned. The main theme is the
effect of the law of labor relations upon the development of unionism and
collective bargaining in the United States. This is discussed chronologically
with three*major periods being sharply distinguished: the long period beginning with the conspiracy cases of the early nineteenth century and
extending until the nineteen-thirties; the fifteen years from the enactment
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act (followed soon by the Wagner Act) to the
Taft-Hartley Act; and the most recent period. These periods the author
entitles respectively: "Legal Suppression of Collective Bargaining," "Government Encouragement of Collective Bargaining," and "Restriction on
Collective Bargaining."
Such an interpretation of the role the government has played in the
development of collective bargaining in the United States is not original
with the author. No one else, however, has so extensively presented the
evidence justifying these characterizations. To the reviewer, they seem
too broad to be completely accurate, but the evidence mustered by the
author is most impressive.
.
Although in the period before the Wagner Act there were no statutes
prohibiting unions or collective bargaining, and after the eighteen-thirties
no decisions holding them to be illegal, the government was far from
neutral in contests between employers and unions. Far from pursuing a
policy of non-intervention, as is often claimed nowadays, the government
intervened in many labor disputes on the side of the employers. This was
done in court decisions and took the form of injunctions in labor disputes,
enforcement of "yellow-dog contracts," and anti-trust law prosecutions of
unions.
The complete reversal in the government's attitude in the nineteenthirties is attributed to the Great Depression and the changes in public
opinion it produced. Not only was labor accorded protection against acts
of employers designed to keep out or undermine unions, but it was made
a positive duty of employers to bargain collectively with unions representing a majority of their employees. Unions were not exempted from the
anti-trust laws, but through Supreme Court decisions were, in effect,
rendered immune from prosecutions unless they acted collusively with
businessmen. And the Supreme Court broadly protected picketing as an
exercise of the right of free speech.
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In the most recent period which is still continuing, there has again
occurred an almost complete reversal of government policy. The "yellowdog contract" has not been revived; the basis for prosecuting unions under
the anti-trust laws has not been broadened; and injunctions, while decidedly on the increase, still are not as great an obstacle to unions as they
were in the nineteen-twenties. But Supreme Court decisions have greatly
narrowed the right of picketing; many states havw enacted laws severely
restricting union activities; and, above all, the Taft-Hartley Act has replaced the Wagner Act.
There has never been brought together such an extensive detailed
indictment of the Taft-Hartley Act, as is presented in this book. The
author does not call the Act a "slave law" and recognizes that some legal
restrictions upon unions may be appropriate. But he finds hardly anything
in the Taft-Hartley Act which has worked out well. While passed as
"an equalizing law," it actually "has changed the basic direction of national
labor policy." "Its philosophy is basically anti-union." Its effect has been
to restrict "vital union activities and processes" and to provide "employers
*with a variety of anti-union weapons." It has already halted union progress, despite the fact that employment conditions have been very favorable
to union advances.
So many of the specific provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act are claimed
to have worked out in the above manner that only a few can be noted in
this review. The law has not prevented the abuses which have developed
under some closed shop contracts, but seriously restricts the freedom of
employers and unions to agree upon the form of union security provisions
which best suits their peculiar situation. The check-off provision, similarly,
"circumscribes free collective bargaining without protecting the individual
worker from excessive dues or initiation fees, unjustified fines, or indiscriminate special assessments." The Act impairs the grievance procedure
as the method of enforcement of labor-management agreements by encouraging resort to the courts in cases of alleged contract violations. It
outlaws all sympathetic action by unions (called "secondary boycotts" by
supporters of the Act), producing a situation in which "the doctrine established by the Supreme Court in the labor union anti-trust cases is again
the law." It also "endangers the success of economic strikes because it
disfranchises displaced economic strikers." Its procedure for coping with
strikes producing national emergencies has been a demonstrated failure.
It has made it uncertain what unions may do by way of picketing and,
through many provisions, makes organizational efforts of unions more
difficult. It has tipped the scales decidedly on the side of the employers
and has greatly increased the interference of government in labor-management relations. These and still many more indictments of the TaftHartley Act are documented in this book by "chapter and verse" citations
from the law and the decisions rendered thereunder.
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Although publicly on record in condemnation of the Taft-Hartley Act,
even before its passage and many times since, the reviewer does not agree
with all the views and conclusions presented in this book. It is not the
final word on the operation of the Taft-Hartley Act. But it is a scholarly
piece of work, by a qualified academic man who has no identification with
organized labor and who, in this book, indicates a quite critical attitude
toward many things that unions often do. It merits attention from all
who want to know why organized labor continues to demand unconditional
repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act and why Senator Taft, himself, proposed no
less than twenty-eight far-reaching amendments in the bill which he persuaded the Senate to pass as a substitute for the Administration's repeal
bill.
Edwin E. Witte t

By Robert N. Cook. The Foundation Press, Inc.,
Brooklyn, New York, 1951. Pp. 867. $8.00.
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LEGAL DiRATING.

Of course when one undertakes to review a textbook, one's first
inquiry must be, just what is the purpose of the book. Fortunately, Professor Cook, the editor of Legal Drafting, tells us at the outset that his
book is intended for use in law school courses on legal drafting and for
reference use by practicing attorneys. Perhaps this dual purpose furnishes
the basis for the most valid criticism of the work.
To the practicing attorney the cases reported in the volume are not
of great value, and to the student the reference material is rather overwhelming. It may be added that the cases reported are very few, so that,
as a case book, its great size seems beyond what is necessary. Much the
greater number of its 860 pages is devoted to philosophical essays on the
use of language, which are far over the head of the average student, and
to forms and check lists which are much more useful to the practitioner
than to the student. In other words, it seems to this reviewer that the
material more usefully could be divided into two books, one pointed solely
at the law student and the other at the practitioner. The material itself
is excellent and the need for each of these two suggested books is great.
The average law graduate who is instructed to draw an agreement
or will or other legal document, unless he has access to a form book, is
as helpless as if he were asked to write a five act tragedy for the theatre.
If he is fortunate he has had a tiny bit of experience in drafting a brief
for a moot court argument-and that, by the way, opens a very important
field not touched on in Professor Cook's book, namely, the drafting of
briefs, which surely is a part of the subject of legal drafting.
Perhaps law schools in the past have considered that the drafting
of agreements and wills is too practical an operation to meet the requiref Chairman, Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin.
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ments of scholastic dignity to which law schools aspire, or perhaps it was
recognized that writing these papers really is post-graduate work requiring
a full understanding of the law of contracts and decedents' estates, and
therefore this work should follow the completion of those courses. In
any event, it is a fine thing that a movement is on foot to give students
practice in writing legal papers, and Professor Cook's book undoubtedly
will stimulate that movement.
The formal aspects of legal drafting, as distinguished from the substantive legal problems presented, are well illustrated in Professor Cook's
book. Perhaps there is more space given to discussing the preparation
of statutes than will prove of value to students or young lawyers. In this
regard, the general principles of definition of words employed, of the
value or lack of value of preambles, of the dangers of punctuation, are set
forth interestingly and instructively.
I hope that the teachers in this course will tell their students what
probably does not belong in a textbook but what is perhaps more important than a great deal that is contained in a textbook-namely, that
only a legal genius can hope to strike off a satisfactory paper at first
dictation. A handwritten first draft-if handwriting still is extant-and
a yellow paper second draft, are evidences not of lack of skill in drafting,
but of an intelligent understanding of human limitations.
For the practitioner the forms are excellent, but I do get the feeling that
if the word "thorough" is capable of comparatives, the forms used are
almost too thorough. By the time the lawyer attempted to thrash out
with the parties their view on all the items suggested, I fear that any
meeting of the minds which they may have thought had occurred before
they consulted the lawyer would be out of the window. However, as a
check list, it is very good. The chapter on labor agreements is especially
valuable to the lawyer who is not a specialist on labor law.
Of course, the great question is how far we should go in mechanizing
drafting. Is there room for individuality of expression, or must we try to
approximate the stereotyped form of a promissory note? Can an agreement be interesting as well as accurate? Is it permissible to regard a
literary touch as not out of place? Is it necessary in drawing a will to
insist that the testator refer to his wife as "my wife, Emily," and not as
"my beloved wife, Emily," and by the omission of this sentimental word
perhaps grievously wound a mourning widow? Certainly "Whereas" is
not a valuable word in a contract, and one smiles as one reads the obsolete
language of a deed, and one knows that a "will" is a "last will and testament," but these remnants of our glorious past are harmless, and should
we strip ourselves of all of them just to show how efficient we are? In
fact, the individuality of the lawyer cannot be eliminated from his authorship, and no rules can prevent the possibility that language which seems
perfectly clear when written will become of doubtful meaning when unanticipated circumstances arise, and this despite the fact that since 1800
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the number of words in the English language has risen from fewer than
100,000 to almost 500,000.
To sum up, Professor Cook's book is a fine work in a field much in
need of such a book, and my only recommendation would be that it be
split into two parts--one for students and one for lawyers.
Morris Wolf

t Member of the Philadelphia Bar.

